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The document here is the authors’ accepted manuscript for the following 
publication: Tousley, Nikki Coffey and Kallenberg, Brad J. “Virtue Ethics.” 
In Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, edited by Joel Green, Jacqueline Lapsley, 
Rebekah Miles and Allen Verhey. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011. 
 
 
 
Virtue Ethics 
Brad J. Kallenberg 
 
If a burglar is breaking into the house, it is too late to begin lifting weights. 
Underneath the humor, there is a truism: You are always becoming the person you 
are. This truism is the basis for a model of ethics.1 
 
1.   What is Virtue Ethics? 
It is sometimes helpful to think about moral situations as having three 
logical moments: Agent(s) perform Action(s) that result in Outcome(s). One brand 
of ethics treats outcomes as the most important consideration in determining right 
and wrong (e.g., utilitarianism). Another brand of ethics claims that some actions 
are right or wrong regardless of outcomes. What makes for rightness or wrongness 
in their eyes is the kind of deed an action is (e.g., Kantianism). And of course, every 
kind of ethicist will insist that both action and outcomes are germane to serious 
ethical analysis. But virtue ethics takes special note of the agents doing the deed. 
                                                 
1
 As always, I am grateful to terrific colleagues Mac Sandlin, Aaron James, and Ethan Smith 
who have made insightful and clarifying suggestions to earlier drafts of this essay. 
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In the first place, virtue ethics considers the deed in relation to “human 
excellence,” or to the question “What is human life for?” In addition to 
consideration of the human telos (where the Greek word telos names the “end” or 
“intended purpose” of a being or artifact), in the second place, virtue ethics also 
seeks thick descriptions rather than thin ones.2 Since just about any act can be 
made to align with some principle or other provided the deed is described thinly 
enough, virtue ethics works hard to attend to all the particulars related to agents, 
actions and outcomes.3 Consider the following example. Francis of Assisi is 
championed as the paradigm of charity. Refusing to take over his father’s 
prosperous enterprise, Francis disavowed his family wealth by stripping naked and 
swapping his rich man’s tunic for the flea-ridden rough shirt of a local beggar. 
Thereafter becoming the most famous of the mendicant preachers, Francis’s self-
induced poverty is taken by some to be a morally supererogatory habit. If however, 
I model my own life after St. Francis and give away my fortune (ha!), I would not 
be acting in imitation of St. Francis. Why? Because his life and mine are similar 
only under “thin” descriptions: “religiously minded males intent on growth in 
personal holiness.” If the descriptions are made slightly more “thick” so as to 
include marital status (Francis never married, Kallenberg is married and father of 
                                                 
2
 The term “thick description” was coined by the Gilbert Ryle and was later made famous in 
cultural studies by Clifford Geertz. Gilbert Ryle, “The Thinking of Thoughts: What Is ‘Le Penseur’ 
Doing?,” in Collected Papers (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1971), ch. 37. 
http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/csacsia/vol14/papers/ryle_1.html  
3
 See ch. 1 of Charles Pinches, Theology and Action: After Theory in Christian Ethics (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002). For an example of the difference detail description makes see Brad J. 
Kallenberg, “The Descriptive Problem of Evil,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on 
the Problem of Natural Evil, ed. Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger, SJ 
(Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory Press, 2007), 297-322. 
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three children), then the voluntary poverty that is heroic in Francis’s case may 
prove to be downright immoral in my own!4 
With respect to human excellence Aristotle has famously said, 
[I]t is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the 
middle….any one can get angry or to give or spend money—that is easy—
but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with 
the right aim, and in the right way, that is not for every one nor is it easy; 
that is why goodness is both rare and praiseworthy and noble.5 
While agreeing with Aristotle, I hasten to add that not only is the noble deed 
difficult to execute, it is almost as difficult rightly to describe! Part of what makes 
thick description tricky relates to the acuity (or lack thereof) of moral eyesight. 
Even a highly detailed description may fail to make the point to an audience that is 
morally myopic. Outcomes and action classes are both included in thick 
description. But thick description does not end with answering “what kind of deed 
was done?” and “what happened next?” Nor is it sufficient to detail the action’s 
object, extent, timing, intention and manner as Aristotle suggests. In addition, an 
adequate description must be made of the identity of the agent. The agent’s 
character is made clear by a triple-level analysis. 
When I was a college student, my friend Matt and I stood one night outside 
his rental house in the grungy part of the city when a large sedan with six 
passengers drove slowly past us. We were joking and laughing—as Christians are 
wont to do! Suddenly the car slammed on its brakes about 20 feet beyond where 
                                                 
4
 This illustration reproduced from “The Descriptive Problem of Evil,” 301. 
5
 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle (Bollingen Series; 
71:2), ed. Jonathon Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), II.9. 
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we stood. A muscular guy leapt from the car and stormed towards us wielding a 
tire iron, furious because he thought we were laughing at him. 
At that moment I had a variety of options I might have taken. I could run 
(since Matt and I were running partners, I knew that I was faster than Matt!). I 
could close the distance and preemptively land the first punch. I could interpose 
myself between Matt and the attacker, shielding my friend from harm, come what 
may. Then again, I could act crazy, say by drooling or singing “Feeling Groovy” at 
the top of my lungs. Whatever I chose to do, there are a three levels to describe 
“doing right.”  
The first level of analysis considers whether what I do is the “right thing” or 
the “wrong thing.” Let’s suppose, for sake of argument, that under these conditions 
fleeing the scene is the “wrong thing” to do and that shielding Matt from harm is 
the “right thing” to do. The second level considers why I did it. I might do the right 
thing for ignoble reasons. Perhaps I wanted to impress female onlookers peeking 
through shuttered windows or alternatively to get a psychological hold over Matt 
by placing him in my debt. Such reasons would certainly cheapen the moral value 
of my deed even if I did the “right thing.” But let’s suppose further, again or sake of 
argument, that I shield Matt for a good reason, for love of my friend. There is a 
third level to consider. For in the weeks to come the chatter in our circles might go 
one of two ways. “Kallenberg did what?! Really? Are you certain? Surely not…not 
Brad J. Kallenberg! I don’t believe it!” Or, the banter might have the opposite 
flavor: “What a great guy! That is just the sort of thing Kallenberg would do! Why I 
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remember last month when he….” 
Whether or not my friends are surprised is a crucial index of the sort of 
character I embody. This threefold description is how a virtue ethicist describes 
the telos or goal of human living: doing the right thing for the right reason and 
having your friends never be surprised.6 Implicit in this triple-level account is that 
the encounter with the tire-iron, odd though it may be, was yet one more action 
that serves to constitute my character and to extend that character into the 
future—assuming my survival! 
From the vantage of Christian virtue ethics, the point is never simply to 
extend my personal story. Rather, as a Christian I am implicitly committed 
extending Jesus’ story. And this can happen on two levels, both on the individual 
level and on the corporate level. The first level can be seen in the first chapter of 
Philippians.  
I’ve often been bothered by the fact that Paul seems so unconcerned that 
the Gospel was being preached in the wrong manner—out of jealousy, strife, 
selfish ambition, and even with an eye to injuring Paul! (1:15-17) But Paul shrugs, 
“What then? Only that in every way Christ is proclaimed. And in this I rejoice, and 
I will rejoice.” (1:18) While it is surely right for Christians to worry about the 
confusion that may ensue when the Gospel message is parroted by fakers, Paul 
sees a deeper good in play. What the fakers cannot do to Paul is prevent the 
extension of the real story line. In verse 20, Paul uses the Greek term megalunō to 
                                                 
6
 Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, Rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 1997), 90-99. 
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connote that he wins in either case: “according to my earnest expectation and 
hope, that I will not be put to shame in anything, but that with all boldness, Christ 
will even now, as always, be magnified (megalunō) in my body, whether by life or 
by death.” The term is generally translated as “exalt” or “magnify.” But such a 
rendering leaves unspecified the question, “With respect to what will Christ be 
magnified?” Will Christ be greater in terms of glory, time, wealth, extension, 
education, job security, or what? I suggest a narratival magnification fits this 
context best. The character and plotline of Paul’s life physically extends (a 
legitimate meaning of megalunō) the story of Christ in time and space. Paul’s 
biography recapitulates Christ’s story. On the one hand, some hearers may 
genuinely convert to follow Jesus despite the ill will of the fake preachers. On the 
other hand, even if there are no converts, the message still comes through loud 
and clear. Why? Because Christ’s kenotic character is made well known by Paul’s 
imitation of Christ, namely the unjust suffering that he willingly and joyfully 
endured (“for the joy set before him…”7). 
So Christian virtue ethics analyzes moral situations relative to the “fit” of its 
action as measured against the character of Christ revealed in the Gospel 
narratives. For virtue ethics, the metric is not so much effectiveness as faithfulness 
to the Gospel. On the first level, faithfulness to the Story has been considered on 
the individual level. 
The second level on which the story of Jesus can be extended resembles the 
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 Heb. 12:2, NASB. Unless otherwise noted, Scripture translations are my own. 
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first, but exceeds it in important ways. Individual agents may approach similarity 
to aspects of Christ’s character, as we saw in Paul (and which Paul may have 
learned by witnessing Stephen’s prayer of extravagant forgiveness—in imitatio 
Christi—while being stoned). In addition, a community as a whole can be shaped 
in the pattern of Christ (i.e., “Christomorphic”). Later in the same chapter, Paul 
urges “Only conduct yourselves in a manner worthy of the gospel of Christ” (1:27). 
Hiding behind the English translation is a very unique verb. The term politeuomai 
is not about behaving ourselves as much as it is about forming the right kind and 
manner of polis (community). This command is fulfilled at the individual level by 
individual faithfulness to Christlikeness. Yet the character of the whole community 
is not simply the summing up of the individual parts, for the community has its 
own order of reality and character. That character exercises top-down influence on 
the parts.8 It is this level of consideration—the level of “form of life” or “communal 
character” that can resemble Christ in ways that no individual can. It is together 
that we achieve “mature man [andra teleiōn], to the measure of the stature which 
belongs to the fullness of Christ.9 “It is together that we physically extend 
(megalunō) the Incarnation in the world. It is together that we constitute the 
“body of Christ” with Christ as our only head. To the extent that churches in the 
West are stripped down to nothing more than microcosms of (un)civil society, this 
corporate telos is obscured. 
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 For an accessible account of top-down causation see ch. 6 of Nancey Murphy, Beyond 
Liberalism and Fundamentalism (Philadelphia, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996). 
9
 Eph. 4:13, NASB. 
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In short, virtue ethics revolves around the question “What ought we be?” In 
order to see how we might begin to respond to this kind of question in concrete 
situations, we must get clear on two terms” (1) Who is the “we”? and (2) What is 
meant by “ought”?  
 
2.   Who is the “we”?  
We, that is, human beings, are created animals who do our living in a 
material world by means of finite material bodies. To be human is to be enfleshed, 
embodied, incarnate. In this section I will investigate what it means to be a 
“human moral agent” by attending to the nature of our bodiliness. Although we 
each, as members of the species homo sapiens, presume to have insider knowledge 
about human agency, I will begin with reminders of what the Incarnation shows us 
about being be human. 
In the first place, bodies matter. The Incarnation was great deal of trouble 
to undergo if, in the end, bodies don’t really matter. I mean, why didn’t God simply 
send a philosophical treatise instead of embodying the kingdom in a living, 
breathing, suffering, bleeding, dying human person?10 Apparently the kingdom 
could not be embodied without a body. As 4th-century theologian Gregory of 
Nazianzus famously put it, “that which [Christ] has not assumed He has not 
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 The plural pronoun of Luke 17:21 indicates this translation, “the kingdom of God is 
among y’all.” Jesus himself stood in their midst as the embodiment of the coming/now here reign of 
God. 
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healed.”11 Christ rescued us entirely—heart and mind, emotions and will, soul and 
body—by taking on our humanity in every aspect. Bodies matter, because Christ 
took on a human body. Moreover, if human bodies were of no import, why bother 
with resurrection? For not only do we worship a risen Savior who is eternally 
incarnate, we too are promised eternal life with a body—resurrected, to be sure, 
but a body nonetheless. 
The bodiliness of Jesus’ human existence is pretty plain to see. He got 
hungry, thirsty and tired. He walked from place to place, and had to sit down from 
time to time. He wept when his friend died and bled when stabbed with a spear 
and bruised when pummeled with fists. Of particular interest for us is the fact that 
Jesus, whose body is fully human, shared with human beings these bodily traits: 
some of his knowledge was incomplete (his human brain, like ours, only weighed a 
couple of pounds). He wasn’t born an adult, but as a helpless baby who slowly 
grew up physically, socially, and mentally.12 Along the way Jesus formed 
disposition and habits.13 And one of the things he had to learn was obedience. 
Importantly, the way he learned obedience was through bodily suffering.14 Don’t 
misunderstand me: Jesus never failed to obey. But he learned obedience as a 
process over time, like we do. He wasn’t ready to go to the cross at age 12 because 
                                                 
11
 Gregory of Nazianzus, “To Cledonius the Priest against Apollinarius. (Ep. 101),” ed. Philip 
Schaff and Henry Wace, A Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Series 2, Vol 7 (1890),  
http://www.ccel.org/print/schaff/npnf207/iv.ii.iii. 
12
 Luke 2:52. 
13
 “As was his custom” Jesus arose early to pray in a lonely place; went to the synagogue; 
taught the crowds, and so on. E.g., Lk 4:15, 22:39. 
14
 Hebrews 5:8, NRSV, “Although he was a Son, he learned obedience through what he 
suffered.” 
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at age 12 he was successfully obeying 12-yr-old-sized commands. Not until 
adulthood was he ready for the ultimate obedience. Until that moment he was still 
in process, he was still learning. (The author of Hebrews uses the verb for learning 
that in the noun form means “disciple.”) Perhaps Jesus’ greatest temptation was to 
resist temptation using divine resources. But he did not. He obeyed perfectly while 
doing so humanly. Jesus opted to learn how to obey by taking the same route we 
must: by starting with easy tasks and tackling more and more difficult ones as he 
grew. In this way his body, and our bodies, learn obedience. That is part of what 
Incarnation means. It is the bodily aspect of the human condition that will help 
bring virtue ethics into focus. I’ll explain the irreducibly bodily nature of virtue 
ethics by stating and defending four claims. 
 
2.1   The quality of any human person’s knowledge is a function of the 
quality of that person’s habits. 
 
When Luke described Jesus’ custom of praying in the Mount of Olives 
(22:39), he uses the word ethos, the standard Greek word for “habit.” When the 
vowel is lengthened, the cognate ēthos connotes “character.” These two are the 
etymological sources for the English “ethics.” For the Greeks, one’s character was 
public. One’s ēthos was simply the constellation of all of one’s habits. Moreover, 
one’s character was also thought to be stable. Although the young could not 
display firm and unchangeable character, through the tending of one’s habits over 
a long time, one’s character eventually becomes “steady” (hexis). The Greeks were 
pretty optimistic on this point and perhaps unjustifiably so. Nevertheless, it seems 
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uncontroversial to claim that there is an ordinary connection between habits and 
character: the person who acts in a generous manner time and time again is 
counted on to act with similar generosity the next time too. We call such a 
character “generous” and thereby know, basically, what to expect from such a 
person. 
The shaping of character takes time. The series of intentional acts that goes 
into the formation of habits (and eventually character) involves increasing 
attunement to one’s surroundings. If a repeated action is the beginning of a habit, 
what is habituated is one’s disposition to take his or her surroundings in a 
particular way. The world is a vast blooming buzzing confusion. What causes us to 
notice one aspect rather than another is due, in large part, to previous bodily 
action. Theologian G. Simon Harak relates a poignant story. 
When I was younger, I studied karate for a few years, going three 
times a week for practice. One day, two fellow students of theology and I 
decided to go to a movie. Fran was a former Marine sergeant. John was a 
bright and articulate student. After we had bought our tickets individually, 
we regrouped in the lobby. “Did you see that guy on the other side of the 
ticket booth?” Fran asked me. “Yeah,” I replied. “He sure was cruisin’ for a 
bruisin’, wasn’t he?” “You know,” Fran said, “the look on his face…I was just 
waiting for him to try something,” and he put his right fist into his left 
palm. I started to say, “If he made a move on me, I would’ve…” but John 
interrupted us by saying, “What guy?” 
The facts are these: Fran and I saw this young man, and we were 
ready even to fight with him. John, a bright and alert person, didn’t even 
perceive him. Why? The key lies in our respective backgrounds. In our 
history, Fran and I shared a training in violence. It was, significantly, a 
physical training which disposed us to “take things in a certain way.” 
Specifically, we were looking for trouble.” And we found it. John, with no 
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such training, didn’t even perceive the “belligerent” young man.15 
To the extent that the previous bodily actions are repeated frequently over a long 
enough span of time, the training of one’s “eyesight”—what he or she is disposed 
to see—becomes a part of his or her character. 
The connection of habits and “moral eyesight” can make sense out of 
otherwise puzzling biblical texts. The Psalmist insists that  
With the loyal you [YHWH] show yourself loyal; 
 with the blameless you show yourself blameless;  
with the pure you show yourself pure; 
 and with the crooked you show yourself perverse!16 
 
Translators sometimes shy away from translating the Hebrew patal as “perverse” or 
“twisted.” But the psalmist is not knocking God, but speaking the truth about the 
inability of the twisted person to see all things, even God, as anything but twisted. 
A second puzzling passage comes from the eighth chapter of Mark’s Gospel. 
As a young Christian I was always a bit sheepish about the healing of the 
blind man in Mark 8. After all, I reasoned, the Christ I worshipped was fully God as 
well as fully man, so why couldn’t the blind man see on the first try? Why did it 
take the Son of God a “do over” to get it right? And why did Mark’s Jesus seem 
entirely unconcerned by the initial flop? As I matured I was taught about the 
crucial importance of reading each pericope in context. As I read more widely I 
discovered that this man wasn’t the only person in Mark who couldn’t see clearly. 
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 G. Simon Harak, Virtuous Passions: The Formation of Christian Character (Mahwah, NJ: 
Paulist Press, 1993), 34. 
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 Ps 18:25-26, NRSV. To cite another example, Paul remarks to Titus “To the pure, all things 
are pure; but to those who are defiled and unbelieving, nothing is pure, but both their mind and 
their conscience are defiled” (1:15; NASB). 
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Mark’s Gospel has a “breathless” quality that comes from the presence of 
“and” (kai) at the beginning of nearly every paragraph. So regular is the use of 
“and” that when it is missing, it signals a sectional break. Mark 8:1 lacks an “and” as 
does Mark 9:38. This means that Mark 8:1-9:38 is thematically connected as a 
single section. What is the theme? Blindness! If we move paragraph by paragraph 
we can notice a recurring pattern.  
8:14-17 After cleaning up from the feeding the 4,000 (8:1-10) and arguing 
briefly with the Pharisees (8:11-13), the disciples are in the boat, having 
forgotten to take bread along. Jesus begins teaching about the “leaven of the 
Pharisees,” and the disciples misunderstand. Jesus asks, “Do you not yet see 
or understand?” (8:17). 
8:15-21 Jesus continues to interrogate the disciples about the previous 
miracle, ending with “Do you not yet understand?” 
8:27-33 Jesus and the disciples are walking throughout Caesarea Philippi. 
The moment after Peter makes his public confession of Jesus as the 
Messiah, he sticks his foot in his mouth, not seeing the possibility 
crucifixion. Jesus rebukes him: “Get behind me, Satan! For you are setting-
your-mind (phroneō) not on divine things but on human things.” (8:33) 
9:9-13   The disciples are arguing privately because they couldn’t see what 
“rising from the dead” could possibly mean. 
9:14-29; 30-32 after another miraculous healing, Jesus returns to the topic of 
his impending death and resurrection. “But they did not understand what he 
was saying and were afraid to ask him.” (9:32) 
The healing of the blind man (8:22-26) sits in the midst of five other stories of 
blindness.  
Mark’s juxtaposition of the disciples’ obtuseness with the healing of the 
blind man makes it clear: the repair of human moral vision may be a process that 
takes time. The timeful changing of how we are disposed to take the world is what 
I’m calling habit- and character-formation.  
 14 
Does the relation between the quality of our character and the quality of 
our knowledge mean that God is prevented from breaking into darkness with 
divine revelation? Of course not. When that happens we call it “grace.” But the fact 
that God can break in, and sometimes opts to do so, is poor grounds for ignoring 
the way that insight and understanding ordinarily develops according to growth in 
the quality of the knower’s habits and character. In fact, the close connection 
between repeated actions in the body may help explain why the author of 2 Peter 
describes the path to fruitful knowledge in stepwise fashion: 
Now for this very reason also, applying all diligence,  
in your faith supply virtue (aretē),  
 and in your virtue (aretē), knowledge,  
  and in your knowledge, self-control,  
   and in your self-control, perseverance, 
    and in your perseverance, godliness,  
     and in your godliness, brotherly kindness,  
      and in your brotherly kindness, love.  
For if these qualities are yours and are increasing, they render you neither 
useless nor unfruitful in the true knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.17 
 
What begins with saving faith is followed not by “knowledge” but by “virtue.” The 
term “virtue” simply means good habits. (Bad habits were called “vices.”) Although 
the New Testament avoids general appeal to the concept aretē (perhaps to prevent 
Christians from confusing faithfulness to Jesus with unresolved technical topics in 
Greek philosophy), that it uses the term here sends a clear message: what is born 
of faith grows first by virtuous habit (guided, of course, by tutelage of mature 
others—more on that below). The young disciple’s growth in knowledge and other 
                                                 
17
 2 Pe 1:5-8, NASB. 
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desirable traits from this list is dependent upon the formation of good habits. 
 
2.2  Forming habits is biological 
God invented habits. We know this because even the lowly flatworm can 
“learn” to turn right at the end of a T-shaped petri dish if it encounters a saline 
solution in the left well frequently enough! Habit is simply how animal bodies 
learn. I emphasize bodies here because even for the human animal an enormous 
percentage of learning happens below the level of neocortex.  Throwing a frisbee, 
tying a necktie, riding a bicycle, recognizing the sound of clarinet, walking upright, 
dreading the dentist, tying shoes in the dark, knowing that coffee is brewing, and 
so on endlessly—these are all bits of knowing stored in the body. 
Humans share this kind of learning with animals. The difference between 
us and the animals is that animals form habits under someone else’s direction (or 
by happenstance) while human beings can form habits intentionally, as an aid 
toward long-range self-governance. Having a neocortex does not enable human 
beings to bypass the painful process of bodily learning. Not at all. 
Think of how difficult it is to learn to ride a bicycle. Destin Sandlin recently 
demonstrated how difficult it is to master riding. The experiment posed to him 
was whether he, an avid biker, could ride a bicycle with oppositely geared 
handlebars (turn right to go left, and turn left to go right). It sounds simple, but it 
is not. His neocortex, the part of the brain that reasons abstractly, issued 
instructions on which way to turn. But his body kept over-ruling him. In fact, he 
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practiced every day for 8 months until it “clicked.” (Of course, once it did “click, he 
could no longer ride and ordinary bicycle.) Meanwhile his 6-yr-old son mastered 
the alternative bike in just two-weeks.18 
Steering a bike is not controlled by discursive reasoning processes (also 
called “theoretical reasoning”) but by bodily know-how.19 Bodily know-how is a 
crucial component in “practical reasoning.” By means of practical reasoning we 
“order our ways aright”20 en route to godliness becoming “second-nature,” fragile 
though this acquired nature be. 
 
2.3   Humans form habits intentionally 
Ordinary people do not give public addresses to large crowds or run 
marathons in under four hours or willingly slay other humans in battle. But 
ordinary persons can be trained to do such things. (Whether any of these skills are 
wise to acquire is another matter.) 
The notion of intentional habit formation has a long presence in Christian 
history. The Hebrew Bible begins with the Torah having set for us to follow a 
trajectory or right path.21 Our role, in response, is to “walk” in this path or way. 
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 The YouTube account is here: http://viewpure.com/MFzDaBzBlL0?ref=bkmk. See also 
https://www.youtube.com/user/destinws2?app=desktop. 
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 For an introduction to this topic see Gilbert Ryle, “Knowing How and Knowing That: The 
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 Ps 50:23, NASB. 
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 The Hebrew noun torah (h∂rwø;t) is related to the verb yarah (h∂rÎy) meaning to 
throw a stone or shoot an arrow. The flight-path of the projectile is said to have a “direction” or 
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Walking in the “way of wisdom”22 is not a task that is easily checked off but one 
requiring of us hourly, daily, weekly, seasonally and yearly attunement. The Psalms 
in particular are chock full of admonitions to “walk in the way.” In fact, from the 
vantage of the Psalter, the blessed life is equated with the walking life.23 
The conceptual era that followed the Hebrew Bible was that of Ancient 
Greece. Greek culture was dominated by four schools of thinking: Plato, Aristotle, 
the Stoics and the Cynics. Where “walking in the way” in the Hebrew Bible was 
conveyed as a communal activity, some of the Greek thinkers viewed the moral life 
as more of an individual affair, as an individual quest for truthfulness.24  
For example, Stoic philosophers practiced regular examination of 
conscience by reporting to friends any discrepancy between what they should have 
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 derek kokmah (hDmVkDjœ JK®râ®d) Prov. 4:11. 
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 Psalm 1:1 uses the verb “Blessed is the one….” When asr (rca) is in the Piel it means “to 
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done and what they actually did.25 The aim of this practice of examination was self-
mastery. Stoic asceticism (askēsis) was characterized by two actions working in 
tandem. Since these terms get picked up by New Testament writers, it serves us 
well to consider them closely. 
The first action is meletaō. This Greek word sometimes gets translated as 
“meditation,” but that doesn’t quite express the significance of meletaō or its 
Hebrew counterpart, hagah (e.g., Ps 1:2). The English word “meditation” connotes 
ruminating about something pleasant (a string quartet by Dvořák or the sun 
setting over a lake) or something timelessly true (say, the conservation of 
momentum or Fibonacci’s sequence). But the Greeks would have called these 
examples “contemplation,” which in the case of math and logic, belongs strictly to 
“theoretical reasoning.” Theoretical reasoning deals with universal and necessary 
truths, which is to say, truths that can’t be otherwise.26 But the messy world of 
living systems and interpersonal relationships is not treated so much by theoretical 
reasoning as by “practical reasoning.” 
The last sentence is extremely important one. Insofar as ethics involves 
human beings, ethics exclusively calls for an exercise of practical reasoning, a kind 
of practical savvy that takes note of contingencies and is never completely sure of 
results. We can see the predominance of practical reasoning for early Christians 
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simply by surveying New Testament vocabulary. The New Testament never uses 
theōria in the abstract sense (the Greek term for theoretical reasoning). And the 
kind of knowing associated with theoretical reasoning, epistēmē, in which one is 
certain of having the correct answer (as in the certainty of knowing 2 + 2 = 4) is 
likewise absent from the New Testament.27 In sharp contrast, practical reasoning 
and the attending concepts shows up regularly. The most distinctive of these 
concepts is the name for the skill acquired when one becomes practically wise: 
phronēsis. This term for practical wisdom goes beyond simple “savvy,” 
emphasizing the thought processes that go into mulling over a plan always with an 
eye to taking action. The wise man (phronimos) build his house on a rock; Christ-
followers are called to be wise (phronimos) as serpents, though harmless as doves; 
the companions to the five female morons (mōrai) were five wise young women 
(phronimoi); Peter is rebuked for failing to think (phroneō) God’s priorities; 
Christians can plan-to-act (phroneō) regarding  either things of the Spirit or things 
of the flesh; we are adjured to exercise-the-mind (phroneō) of Christ, and so on.28 
Practical reasoning is the kind of reasoning needed when there cannot be 
one, clear, right answer “in the back of the book.” It is the mode of reasoning 
needed for coping with the messy, contingent, highly unpredictable world in 
which even the most reliable, brand-new machines can bend, break, or melt rather 
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than work like they “should,”29 the kind of world in which relationships will cool, 
sour and wither without constant care. But I’m getting ahead of myself. 
Back to the Stoic form of asceticism that involves two steps. Step one is 
meletaō. For the Stoics, meletaō belongs to practical reasoning. It involves thinking 
about the real world with an eye to acting. For the Stoics, meletaō 
is composed of memorizing responses and reactivating those memories by 
placing oneself in a situation where one can imagine how one would react. 
One judges the reasoning one should use in an imaginary exercise (“Let us 
suppose...) in order to test an action or event (for example, “How would I 
react?”).30 
In short, meletaō is a kind of imaginative training exercise. One improves one’s 
future responses by anticipating in advance real situations through mental role-
play.31 It involves both memorizing a treasury of set responses and then going 
further by envisioning how one might embellish on a set response to adapt to a 
never-before-encountered situation.32 Perhaps the ultra-shy person, before 
venturing out, will rehearse the steps needed for taking the city bus. Since people 
will likely be encountered, the shy person might arm himself or herself with 
adequate quips for responding to uninvited interactions, all the more likely if the 
bus is very late or very crowded. 
The Apostle Paul refers to this culturally familiar notion in his first letter to 
Timothy (1 Tim. 4:13-16). He reminds Timothy to attend to the readings, 
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exhortations, and teachings. We can imagine that these contain the stock scripts 
Timothy needs to rehearse (such as “rejoice always” and “pray constantly”). 
Timothy is told to “practice (meletaō) and inhabit—live into, ‘be in”—these 
things.” The result? His progress would be evident to everyone. This result is not a 
surprise. Virtue ethics expects moral progress to be possible. And insofar as 
character is public, one’s progress (or lack thereof33) will be on display for anyone 
to observe. The link between moral progress and the stock treasury of behavioral 
scripts is meletaō. The present tense imperative mood of both verbs (i.e., both 
“meletaō” and “be in”) indicates a continuous or repeated action. Timothy is to live 
into Christian teaching by means of the ongoing practice of mental rehearsal 
called meletaō. 
The second action word that New Testament writers borrow from Greek 
culture is gumnazō, from which we get the English “gymnastics.” Some prominent 
Greek voices, such as Aristotle, tended to use meletaō as the generic term for 
training.34 But others, like the Stoics, were more explicit in reminding us that 
training is bodily. As important as mental preparation is, training is incomplete 
unless bodies are exercised. This exercise included regularized activities like 
rehearsing dance moves or gymnastic routines. And it also involved more open-
ended exercises, such as scrimmages and improv role playing. 
The physical side of spiritual-moral training was quickly picked up by the 
earliest Christians. Recall that Christianity was illegal in the Empire until the 
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fourth century.35 Thus for some 300 years there were unpredictable waves of 
persecution, some of which were very severe. During this era we read reports of 
the most eccentric forms of Christianity.36 They practiced sleep deprivation, light 
deprivation, intentionally poor diet (mixing ashes with their food), semi-starvation 
(fasts of 2, 3, even 40 days), isolation, and self-inflicted pain (e.g., binding up limbs 
with leather thongs until the limb went numb; when the straps were released the 
returning blood supply to the limb was excruciatingly painful). These are certainly 
strange tales. Most Christians today are embarrassed by these oddballs who 
claimed to follow Jesus. Today we would quickly refer them for psychiatric 
treatment and hospitalize them for their own safety. But what if there was method 
in their madness? What if, given their justifiable expectation of imminent torture 
at the hands of pagan rulers, these oddballs were training themselves to endure?37 
The Romans had gotten quite creative in their methods of torture.38 What if the 
so-called “whacko” Christians were not so whacko after all, but Christians of the 
utmost seriousness and practical wisdom? Fourth-century church historian 
Eusebius recounts the tale of one Christian woman who could not be broken. 
Blandina was filled with such power that those who tortured her from 
morning to night grew exhausted and admitted that they were beaten, for 
they had nothing left to do to her. They were astounded that she was still 
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alive, since her whole body was smashed and lacerated, and they claimed 
that any one of the tortures was enough to end life, let alone a succession of 
them augmented. But the blessed woman, like a noble athlete, gained in 
strength while confessing the faith and found comfort in her sufferings by 
saying, “I am a Christian and nothing wicked happens among us.”39 
It was cases like these that turned the tables on paganism. Rather than the torturer 
breaking the will of the Christian, the practiced resilience of the Christian broke the 
torturers. 
Returning to New Testament ethics, we find gumnazō applied in Hebrews 
5:14, “But solid food is for the mature (teleiōn), for those whose faculties 
(aisthētrion) have been fully trained (hexis) by bodily exercise (gumnasia) to 
skillfully discern (diakrisis) good from evil.”40 Two terms indicate that, according 
to the author of Hebrews, it is bodily exercise that completes the formation 
process. The word teleiōn connotes “mature” in the sense that such ones have 
achieved their purpose or telos. In addition, the author uses the word hexis, which 
in Greek culture meant “second nature” or a steady condition of the soul. The 
upshot of the training was improved discernment.  
We don’t need convincing that good and evil are not always easy to tell 
apart. Although sometimes they can be. The answer to the question “Shall I 
murder my neighbor?” can be looked up in any number of ethical tables. But we 
run into difficulty with the murkier cases. Then perhaps we need something more 
like a “reliable nose.” Today we use terms like “reliable nose,” “good ear,” and 
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“delicate touch,” and “skilled eye” to refer to highly trained surgeons, engineers, 
musicians, and so on—practitioners who have spent long years honing their skills 
through physical practice (typically under the tutelage of a master). Likewise in 
Hebrews 5:14, the word for “perceptive faculties” (aisthētrion) refers not to 
perceptiveness available to anyone, but perception by those who have been fully 
trained. The doctor reading an X-ray, the musician listening to a performance, the 
engineer observing a faulty mechanism—these practitioners each perceive things 
obvious to them but lost on the rest of us. Let’s face it, even when the physician 
tries to show us what the X-ray “clearly shows,” we can’t see anything remarkable 
at all. But that is because we are unexercised. 
We may live in a democracy, but virtue ethics is not democratic. Virtue 
ethics is a varsity sport. Those who work hardest and respond well to coaching 
make the most progress and, therefore, get the most playing time. 
It is no surprise that the first Christians valued skilled judgment and 
discernment. What may be surprising is the notion that “a good nose” for telling 
good from evil is not something one is born with. It is not something that one can 
simply turn on like a light switch. Rather, skilled judgment is developed by bodily 
training. But why should Christians find that so surprising? The Incarnation of the 
Son together with the repeated promises of our bodily resurrection, seem to 
constitute a pretty strong hint that whatever else the Christian life is, it cannot be 
anything but bodily. Despite the temptation to think of the mind as the complete 
controller of the body (a view inherited from Plato), repeated bodily activity has 
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been shown to change the physical structures in the brain.41 This recent finding is 
a game-changer for ethics. All to say: the way of wisdom in ethics need not begin 
with a speculative theory. Rather, it may begin by bodily training.  
This section began with the claim that “humans form habits intentionally.” 
But now I must clarify whose intention is at work. On the one hand, according 
virtue ethics, every intentional act is inherently a moral act. There may be non-
intentional actions, such as when I absent-mindedly scratch my chin. (This class of 
actions I share with my dog, who also scratches her chin.) But insofar as an act is 
done intentionally—insofar as I have a reason for acting, my action is value 
laden.42 (“Having a reason” is not something I can say of my dog; although she can 
act for a reason, only humans have reasons in acting.) But that is not to say that 
mine is the sole intention embodied in the action I carry out. For example, a 
carpenter’s apprentice may be intending to cut 100 dovetail pins to practice her 
carpentry skills, but a master carpenter to whom she is apprenticed may have 
earlier noticed her shoddy dovetails and assigned her the 100 cuts as a training 
regimen. Her cutting of the 100 pins embodies both her intentions and those of the 
master who trains her.  
The possibility of multiple intentions being realized in a given human act 
turns ethics into a team sport. But before we can examine the sociality of ethics, I 
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must examine on final, oft-overlooked aspect of the condition in which we find 
ourselves constrained to live out our ethics. 
 
2.4  Habit formation is opposed by entropy 
Habits have staying power, but only up to a point. Their failure is attributed 
to a stubborn feature of the fallen world. As members of the physical world, 
human lives are subject to the same conditions that the material world is subject. 
Chief among these is entropy. 
Not all energy in a closed system can be harnessed. Some of it will be 
wasted. The energy that cannot be harnessed is called “free energy.” The rule of 
physics is this: “free energy always increases.” The increase of free energy is why 
your coffee grows cool, why engines overheat, why a clean room gets messy, why 
the guitar goes out of tune, why the wind-up toy winds down and stops. Entropy is 
the name given to explain why mechanisms may bind, break off or melt; why cars 
rust; why living things sicken and die. Entropy is the tendency of things to become 
more random and disordered. 
We live in an entropic world. To a large extent, human living is matter of 
coping with entropy around us. We clean the room, we repair the machine, we re-
wind the toy, we lubricate the engine, we tune the guitar, and we reheat our cold 
coffee. In each instance we are adding energy to the “system” to lessen or postpone 
the effects of entropy. In our entropy-coping existence we have an ally in the fact 
that systems are nested. I stand outside the mini-system of the wind-up toy and 
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can add energy to that system by winding up the toy. The earth as a whole is a 
macro-system that receives a constant injection of energy from outside itself, from 
our sun. Without the sun everything on earth would have run down long, long 
ago. Between the extremes of the mini- and macro-systems is where we do most of 
our living. At every level of system, we are busy adding energy to combat entropy. 
In addition to the gift of sunshine that makes the crops grow without the 
farmer knowing how,43 entropy is a slow enemy and can be delayed by another 
phenomenon of creation. Newton tells us that something in motion tends to stay 
in motion. A moving object “wants to,” and would, stay in motion were it not for 
the slowdown drag of entropy. Physicists call this tendency “momentum.” One of 
the ways engineers are trying to store energy in the twenty-first century is by using 
giant flywheels. These heavy wheels are very, very heavy and very, very difficult to 
put into motion. But once they get up to speed, they tend to keep spinning. They 
won’t spin forever (there is no such thing as perpetual motion), because entropy in 
the form of friction will eventually win the battle and the flywheel will stop. But 
imagine: if the tiny motors that get the flywheel up to speed were, say, solar 
powered, then in the nighttime, the flywheel might return the favor by turning 
turbines to generate electricity until morning.44 
Since human beings belong to the material world, it is not surprising to 
learn that there are human analogs to momentum as well as entropy. We know it 
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is ridiculous to say that “I fell out of love while brushing my teeth!” One might 
realize that love had died during a toothbrushing. But love is like a flywheel; it 
takes time to get it up to full speed and then has a tendency to continue spinning. 
This is why break-ups are so painful; the official relationship may be over, but the 
love flywheel continues to spin, perhaps for a very long time while love winds 
down. And that slow grinding and winding down hurts. 
What we are calling “habits” are on the side of momentum. The fact that we 
can form habits is an enormous gift from our Creator. We could have all be born 
stupid flightless birds, like the emu!45 Thank God, we can learn! Both our bodies 
and our minds can retain each learned lesson (at least for a while).  
But not forever. Entropy in the human world shows itself in the difficulties 
we face retaining our learning and keeping skills from going rusty. Entropy also 
affects our relationships. A close friendship that is left untended for weeks on end 
will slowly cease to be a close friendship. In short, “entropy” names the 
susceptibility of any given friendship to fall into disrepair. And therefore we must 
work at communicating, for miscommunication is just as likely.  
In addition to causing friction between friends, entropy also hinders human 
virtue formation. Obviously, it is far easier to fall into a bad habit than it is to form 
a good one. That we use different terms, “fall” vs. “form,” indicates that the playing 
field is tipped against character development. No, if character is to improve, it will 
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take a regular, repeated, or even constant injection of energy. And although 
growth of habit means one will be slightly more disposed to see and act in the 
habituated way, there are no guarantees. Even the most trenchant habits have a 
failure rate. In fact, a habit in one set of conditions may not hold firmly if one 
simply changes context.46 As a theologian I might prefer to use the term “sin” to 
“entropy.” The point is the same whatever the term. Entropy opposes any and 
every attempt we undertake to do good. But we are assisted by a long list of gifts. 
Taken together, we call these gifts “God’s grace.” It is grace that we can learn and 
form habits; it is grace that we are raised by others we learn to call family; it is 
grace that we received adequate nutrition while our newborn brains were 
developing; it is grace that we were educated by teachers with sound education. 
 
3.   What is meant by “ought”? 
No one is born an expert at anything. We each enter human existence as 
complete and utter novices. Human existence has been going on for millennia, and 
we, as the tiniest of players, enter the game three years before we are potty-
trained. So how do the tiny, untutored players learn what “ought” means? Well, 
they begin in the way they learn all spoken words, by hearing a term over and over 
within a particular context, the word’s “home,” so to speak.47 We learn what “chair” 
means by hearing it spoken while we are sitting on, climbing onto, sliding off of, 
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stubbing toes on, and losing crayons into chairs. Later we will count, fetch, and 
stack chairs. We may even reupholster chairs or play musical ones. We learn what 
“God” means by hearing and saying the word in a host of contexts: praying, 
thanking, singing, evangelizing, confessing, and so on. Likewise the rudimentary 
sense of word “ought” (as well as “should,” “must” and the like) is picked up by its 
association with ordinary daily activities: 
“Ouch!...Mom! She hit me!” (Sally, you shouldn’t hit your brother.”) 
“♫ Everybody ought to go to Sunday School, Sunday School, Sunday 
School….♫” 
“Johnny, make your bed! You have to make your bed before you go out to 
play. You must make your bed this instant. You ought to make your bed 
every day.” 
In simplest terms, words like “should” and “ought” slowly become associated with 
the form of life in which we are trained to act against our instincts. A child is both 
malleable and conflicted. At one level it wants to pull the cat’s tail but at another 
level it learns that this will have bad consequences or disappoint mom (etc.). With 
repetition, the child somehow transfers the desire to avoid consequences to the 
desire to no longer do the bad thing.48 As the child grows, he or she encounters 
more nuanced occasions for hearing “ought” and “should,”: “You should keep your 
knee over the ball when kicking,” and “You’d better clamp that before drilling!” 
Coaching tips are perceived as weightier when the (young) adult, who has sampled 
many practices in childhood, settles on a small handful for a lifetime (say, 
engineering and carpentry, or piano and gardening). The “oughts” learned in the 
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context of skill-based practices are simultaneously bound up with notion of 
“excellence” in the respective practice. 
So far so good. We understand that a novice who is incapable of seeing 
what an expert practitioner sees must be coached by means of heuristics or tips 
that she or he can understand, albeit imperfectly for now but will come to 
understand it fully in time.49 The novice’s devotion to the ongoing task of 
implementing tips and training regimens is a function both of their love for the 
practice itself and their trust in the coach.  
Once, while out walking my dog past the local tennis courts, I tried an 
experiment: I offered a sound coaching tip to a perfect stranger who was practicing 
his serve.50 His response? “I’m just messing around; I don’t want to get any better.” 
Which translated meant, “Mind your own business!” Fair enough! He neither 
trusted me (why should he?) and perhaps really didn’t care about improving. As a 
result, there was nothing more for me to say. But let’s suppose that instead of a 
hack tennis player, we encounter someone who is living badly. And when we offer 
tips for improvement, the hack-at-living says, “I’m just messing around; I don’t 
want to live better!” Are we left tongue-tied? Or are we not rather tempted to say, 
“But you ought to want to live better!” Here the word “ought” transcends any 
locally chosen goals and locally administered tips. One may freely choose to 
pursue excellence in tennis. If excellence in tennis is the goal, then what the player 
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ought to do is obey tips issued by a qualified coach. But in the case of human 
living, the purpose or telos (i.e., that which human life is for) is given, not chosen. 
(On this theological point all four authors agree.) 
We may think we are free to choose a different telos; but we’d be mistaken 
to think so. The human telos is not ours for the choosing any more than horses can 
choose to fly. Sadly, the fact that the human telos is not optional does not make 
discernment of it any easier. Nevertheless, the connection between telos and 
obligation is still fundamental even when we have only a novice’s grasp of the 
telos. 
Take Wilt Chamberlain for example. The former basketball star reportedly 
claimed, by his own reckoning, to have slept with over 20,000 different women. I 
have sometimes asked one half of an ethics class to defend the claim “20,000 is 
good” and the other half to defend the claim “20,000 is bad.” After a lot of 
embarrassed chuckling, the reasons start to trickle in on both sides. Sooner or later 
someone in the class thinks to do the math: 20,000 is more than 2.3 women per 
day. Suddenly the penny drops: Chamberlain’s sexual feat entirely displaced the 
possibility of his maintaining a single long-term intimate relationship. 
Chamberlain may have chosen this telos freely. But even secular students are apt 
to feel sorry for Chamberlain because he was mistaken. Why? Because dying 
without an intimate life partner is not what human life is for. So, one aspect of the 
human telos appears to be intimate friendship. Human life is for making and 
keeping friends, especially a life partner. That much specificity about the human 
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telos is pretty undisputed (even if we lie along a spectrum about what “intimate life 
partner” entails). 
Virtue ethicists claim that if we had a clear grasp of the telos, moral 
obligation would be straightforward. We know clearly what wristwatches are for 
and therefore, we are crystal clear about how a wristwatch ought to perform.51 But 
the human telos is not so straightforward. In fact, people have been arguing about 
what is “the Good” or “excellence” for as long as they’ve been able to speak. And 
note, since we each enter the debate as untutored novices, any single individual’s 
grasp on the telos is going to be affected by the quality of our coaches and our 
respective moral progress to date. Left to our own devices, serving as one’s own 
moral coach may well end disastrously. The trouble in Judges—”all the people did 
what was right in their own eyes”52—is not a culture of moral relativism but the 
poor quality of each person’s “eyes.” The untutored human being when presented 
with the human telos cannot see it any more clearly than his or her character 
allows. The Savior was crucified and raised again to rescue us from, among other 
things, our poor moral eyesight, to save us from the condition described in Psalm 
18, “To the crooked, You appear as twisted.”53 
As a first step in naming the human telos, virtue ethicists, including 
Christian virtue ethicists, examine arenas in which the telos rises close to the 
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surface (like we saw above with friendship).54 One such arena is Practice.55 I’ll 
capitalize “Practice” when I mean any social enterprise by which novices are 
progressively trained by experts to acquire skills by means of which they can both 
excel and grow to appreciate the goods all insiders recognize. Examples of 
formative Practices include medicine, engineering, carpentry, music, and so on. 
Many Practices are the means by which human beings have come to cope with the 
contingent, entropic world.56 Such Practices are valued by the rest of us for their 
usefulness to society. But practitioners themselves value the Practice for goods 
that only an insider can appreciate. (Why else would someone play triple-A 
baseball, or take a degree in theater, or become a theologian?! Not for the wages!) 
Taken together all the Practices constitute the warp and weft of life in 
community. We cannot all be doctors, but some us had better be doctors. We 
cannot all be musicians, but some of had better be or we as a community will fall 
short of achieving the human Good. So goes Aristotle’s argument in Book One of 
Nicomachaen Ethics. And the telos he thinks we’re questing for? Aristotle is a bit 
vague, but at the level of common life he describes the telos as eudaimonia, which 
literally means “good spirit” (perhaps as in, “there’s a sweet, sweet spirit in this 
                                                 
54
 Brad J. Kallenberg, “The Master Argument of Macintyre’s after Virtue,” in Virtues and 
Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics after MacIntyre, ed. Nancey Murphy, Brad J. 
Kallenberg, and Mark Thiessen Nation (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 7-
29. 
55
 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3d ed. (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 187. See also Nancey Murphy, Brad J. Kallenberg, and Mark 
Thiessen Nation, eds., Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics after 
MacIntyre, reprint ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003, repr.). 
56
 The twelfth-century theologian Hugh of St. Victor is the first to see engineering, “ars 
mechanicus,” as part of the gracious, redemptive plan of God. For an account of Hugh’s Didiscalicon 
see ch. 10 of Kallenberg, By Design: Theology, Ethics and the Practice of Engineering. 
 35 
place”) or, as it is more commonly translated, “well-being.” At the level of the 
individual, the human telos with respect to Practice is simply to excel at the 
Practice(s). That description remains equally vague since, as we know, 
understanding of the standards of excellence within a Practice can only be as deep 
as the novice has progressed in the respective training regimen. 
A second arena in which telos comes close to the surface is “tradition.”57 By 
“tradition” I mean to borrow Alasdair MacIntyre’s notion of a group of people who 
exist across time and are identified by their ongoing (sometimes explicit, 
sometimes implicit) discussion about what “the Good” is. When the argument 
breaks the surface into explicit discussion, it is necessarily carried on in a 
particular conceptual language.58 What is the chief telos of being human? “To 
glorify God and enjoy Him forever” says the Westminster Confession. The 
conceptual language all Christians share is a product both of our adherence to 
narratives (see below) and our engagement in Practices that are distinctive to 
living out the Gospel together. Our Christian tradition had its inception at 
Pentecost, when a group of people were animated by God’s Spirit to rally around 
authoritative voices and texts (Peter’s sermon, Paul’s letters, the Evangelists’ 
Gospels, the Hebrew Bible, etc.). These voices and texts launched a conversation in 
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a peculiar Christian dialect.59 To say the same thing differently, we as Christians 
cope with our environment in distinctive ways, both in our manner of speaking 
and by our manner of doing. We might say that the Christian tradition (in 
MacIntyre’s sense) is about a particular pattern of communal living, one 
dominated by the Practices of witness, worship, works of mercy, discipleship and 
(Spirit-directed) discernment60 as well as distinctive manner in executing all 
Practices (for example, charity hospitals).61 Of course, what the phrase “distinctive 
manner” actually means when applied to this or that Practice is something we as 
novices must suffer to learn progressively, as we are coached by those who’ve been 
in the game longer than we.62 Perhaps the most we can say is that our life together, 
the confluence of all these Practices, ought to be shaped like Jesus. (More on this 
below.) Rephrased in terms of “tradition” the telos of human life is faithfully to 
extend the ongoing discussion about the Good by becoming conversant in the 
language called Christian and by means of assiduous participation in identity-
constituting Practices. 
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The third arena, just as nuanced and involved as Practice and tradition, is 
“narrative.” Parents use narrative, or story, to raise their children (think of “Honest 
Abe,” “The Good Samaritan,” and so on) because human beings live story-shaped 
lives and it is only by means of stories that children learn how to tell what “fits” 
and what doesn’t “fit.” This claim is a mouthful. I mean to say that ethics can’t do 
without stories. Truth be told, even the “nothing-but-the-facts” scientist cannot 
get along without stories! Consider: the formula “F = m∙a” is not obvious as a 
standalone expression. A novice might conclude that the force of love is found by 
multiplying the mass of an elephant by the acceleration of the economy. These 
misapplications are only “obvious” to those who have been trained to understand 
which force, which mass, and which acceleration are relevant. How was this highly 
specific skill of similarity recognition cultivated? Story problems; tons of story 
problems. As in physics, so too in theology. The divinely revealed name, “YHWH 
Yireh” (roughly, “the LORD provides”) is but a “law-sketch” that calls to mind the 
much longer tale of Abraham that culminates in the episode of Genesis 22. 
The stories or narratives Christians cling to are not all of equal weight. We 
learn to consider some texts “canonical” insofar as these are the ones we live by. 
The telos of human living according to the narrative slice of virtue ethics, then, is 
“to live faithfully to the right stories.” But again, which stories trump which others 
for priority, and what manner of following makes for faithfulness is something into 
which novices must be trained. 
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To recap: Virtue ethics is inconceivable apart from close attention to the 
human condition. We each begin life naked and untutored and inarticulate. To 
become fully human requires much training. Since we cannot train ourselves, we 
are—especially initially—at the mercy of those who surround us and who give us 
tips for going on in the right way. If all goes well, we get a jump start into the 
habit-formation process. Whether we form the “right” habits—aka virtues—is 
uncertain, since our entire community is battered by a world that is entropic on 
both the material and social level. And rather than conclude that each must “do 
what he or she can,” as the saying goes, virtue ethicists must say rather that each is 
constrained to “do as he or she is inclined,” for each will do what he or she sees as 
“fitting” insofar as his or her inclinations have been previously formed by 
involvement as practitioners in Practices, as voices in our tradition, and as living 
characters in canonical narratives. 
Everything in the former paragraph holds also for Christian virtue 
ethics…except for the parts that are entirely different! Aristotle recognized 
humility as a habit, but disdained it as a nasty habit. For followers of Jesus, 
humility is not a vice, but a virtue of the highest order. What parts are the same 
and which ones differ is a matter for training. For those who are in Christ, “it is a 
whole new world.”63 And we can only act—virtuously or viciously—in the world we 
can see.64 
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4. Application 
For virtue ethics, there is no such thing as an ethical problem “in general.” 
Even recognizing relevant similarities between a new problem and one previously 
dealt with can be tricky, despite being armed with the thickest of descriptions. No; 
every ethical problem is unique, because each one is situated in a particular, never-
to-be-repeated context. Consequently, I’m tempted to stop writing now. But I hope 
one final illustration will make clear the primary lens through which virtue 
ethicists view every ethical problem in particular. Before we can ask “What ought 
so-and-so do?” we must first ask, “What sort of people ought we be?”65  
I worry about technology. I worry about the ways technology alters our 
form of life. And I worry that this alteration warps the kind of community 
Christians ought to be. The 1789 version of the Book of Common Prayer contains a 
“Morning Prayer” that thanks God “especially for having delivered us from the 
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dangers of the past night.”66 The words strike us as odd. Why does the prayer 
sound a bit childish to us? Think about it: We do not give thanks with such 
intensity because we did not fall asleep terrified of the darkness. Why not? Because 
we have electric lights. Has the electric light forever altered the fervor of prayer? 
Quite possibly. We may never know that former fervor, because those who lived 
prior to electrification (ca. 1860s) are no longer around to tell us what it was like.  
Electricity has become deeply embedded in our contemporary form of life. 
“Embeddedness” is one mark that qualifies a technology as politically successful. 
Historian of technology John Staudenmaier observes that some technologies count 
as successful simply because they work well. Glide® Dental Floss is one such 
product. Yet if all the dental floss in the land popped out of existence tonight at 
midnight…no one would notice! That is because dental floss, as well as it works, 
has not become successful in the sense that it fundamentally shapes our 
community, our polis. By contrast consider asphalt. Asphalt works reasonably well, 
although it is ever in need of repair. But if all the asphalt in the land popped out of 
existence at midnight, life would screech to a halt—the loss of truckways, parking 
lots, suburban roads, airplane tarmacs, and so on, would shut down shipment of 
food, medical supplies, mail, building supplies, ad infinitum. Asphalt is “politically” 
                                                 
66
 n.a., “Morning Prayer,” in The Book of Common Prayer, and Administration of the 
Sacraments, and Other Rites and Ceremonies, as Revised and Proposed to the Use of the Protestant 
Episcopal Church, at a Convention of the Said Church in the States of New-York, New Jrrsey [Sic], 
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and South-Carolina, Held in Philadelphia, from 
September 27th to October 7th, 1785, ed. Episcopal Church (London: re-printed for J. Debrett, 
opposite Burlington House, Piccadilly, 1789). 
 41 
successful because it has become deeply embedded in our corporate life.67 We 
could not live for long without it. So too for electricity, the automobile, and indoor 
plumbing. And so too for the smartphone. 
That the smartphone is ethically troubling can be seen from any number of 
angles. There is systemic injustice at the level of the device: the technology is 
completely dependent upon “conflict minerals,” such as tantalum. In the Congo, 
tantalum is being mined under great duress and sold to developed nations, the 
proceeds of which sales fund treacherous civil wars and genocide campaigns.68 The 
devices are assembled by economic slaves, typically somewhere in Asia, whose 
working conditions are so poor that managers at one plant had safety nets 
installed outside worker dormitories to prevent suicidal workers from succeeding 
in jumping to their deaths.69 Social media such as Facebook is kept attractive by 
relentless “content moderation.” A team of over 100,000 work around the clock in 
real time preventing offensive posts (like footage of actual beheadings).70 The two 
billion smartphones in operation today depend upon massive data storage 
infrastructure, euphemistically called “The Cloud.” Actually “The Cloud” is an 
enormous fleet of warehouses in remote locations each burning as much energy as 
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a small town.71  
The above facts are startling enough to give ethicists of any stripe grounds 
for objecting to the use of smartphones as morally tainted. But as a virtue ethicist I 
am also deeply worried about the change to our corporate form of life that social 
media is precipitating as the smartphone becomes “politically” successful in 
Staudenmaier’s sense. For example, studies are beginning to show that our 
attention span related to words is shrinking. (This news can’t help but be troubling 
for “people of the Book.”) Young adults can easily absorb a four-hour film without 
any flagging of energy. But those same persons cannot read printed text for four 
hours much less listen with comprehension to four hours of audio lecture. Of 
course, who would be dumb enough to attempt to deliver a four-hour audio 
lecture! Umm…his name was Abe Lincoln. When Stephen A. Douglas debated 
Lincoln in Peoria, IL, neither was a candidate for major office like U.S. Senate or 
President. They were both ordinary citizens debating ordinary issues on an 
ordinary stage. Douglas spoke uninterrupted for three hours. Lincoln’s reply—
amicably postponed until after dinner, was four hours long. No pictures, no 
sloganeering, just seven hours of highly nuanced debate that presumed the 
listeners not only had familiarity with historical precedents but also could handle 
“irony, paradox, elaborate metaphors, fine distinctions, and the exposure of 
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contradiction.”72 The audience who could listen with comprehension was 
comprised of ordinary folk, bankers, housewives, farmers, and delivery boys. But 
that was 1854. 
I’m unsure whether the dropping attention spans of (some? most? all?) 
individuals counts as a distortion of our form of life. So let me try to make the case 
from a different vantage point. I claim that social media has become embedded in 
the same manner the automobile has, namely by making us a covetous people. 
It is common knowledge that Henry Ford’s assembly line revolutionized 
manufacturing. Before Ford, manufacturing was done on a small scale by 
craftsmen and their guild. Since Ford, it is all assembly line all the time: relatively 
unskilled laborers work like mad to join together pieces previously machined to 
spec.73 What is less commonly known is that a second revolution was precipitated 
a decade later by Ford’s competitor at General Motors: Alfred Sloan. Ford may 
have changed the process, but Sloan changed the telos of manufacturing. 
Previously the purpose of making cars was the car itself. But for Sloan, the 
“primary object” was “not just to make cars” but “to make money.”74 Ford changed 
industry, but Sloan succeeded in changing our whole culture. Instead of 
purchasing an artifact out of need—as my grandparents did—my parents’ 
generation learned to purchase out of sheer desire. Historian Emma Rothschild 
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explains: 
Sloan’s idea for upgrading consumer preferences was that automobiles 
should change each year, and should each year become more expensive (at 
least relative to the cost of production). The rate at which people trade in 
their old cars would grow. Each year, the new-model cars would have more 
improvements added on, different engines, different styling, different 
comfort features. Cars of the same shape and size, made from the same 
basic metal parts, could be sold with different equipment, at different 
prices….Sloan wrote that “It is perfectly possible, from the engineering and 
manufacturing standpoint, to make two cars at not a great difference in 
price and weight, but considerably different in appearance.”75 
Sloan’s strategy became known as “turnover buying,” and the entirety of Western 
culture embraced it. You’ll have to forgive my jaundiced eye: my grandma taught 
my mother how to darn socks so that they’d last forever! Yet when my socks seem 
even a touch saggy, the nice man in the brown truck delivers a bag from Amazon 
to my front door! How long are socks supposed to last? How long do cars last? 
How long do smartphones last? The turnover time of the smartphone is now less 
than three years. 
Every three years we are suckered into desiring a new version of a device 
that pretty much does what the last one did, only costs more.76 Seems like Sloan 
won that ideological battle. But our coveting isn’t bounded by lust for the device 
itself, whether it is the iPhone6, or the iPhone 643. “Free” apps like Facebook 
profitably sell advertising that pops up constantly on smartphone displays. While 
some users pat themselves on the back for resisting the lure of pop-up ads, the 
truth is, if pop-up ads didn’t produce revenue across the targeted population, 
                                                 
75
 Ibid., 38-39. 
76
 Sendhil Mullainathan, “Hold the Phone: A Big-Data Conundrum,”  The New York Times 
 (26 July 2014). http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/upshot/hold-the-phone-a-big-data-
conundrum.html?src=xps&abt=0002&abg=0. 
 45 
there’d be no more pop-up ads. And no more pop-up ads would mean no more 
Facebook.  
St. Isaac of Nineveh, a desert father from the seventh century CE, advised 
younger disciples to be wary: “the sight of [worldly] things, their splendor and 
existence kindles in [our body] a desire for them.”77 So long as these things are 
kept at a distance, continues Isaac, they will cause us little strife. But if worldly 
things are near, our affections resonate with a “strong power…to weaken the 
[Christian] strugglers and turn aside their mind.”78 Smartphone users carry all the 
pleasures of the world in the palm of their hands. Is this wise? And to make 
matters worse, each phone is colluding with giant algorithms that conspire 
together to send automatically especially those ads that pique this user’s lusts. 
Again Sloan wins; we lose. 
Many readers will surely be surprised by grisly details about smartphones of 
which they were unaware. There is a kind of bliss, isn’t there, in remaining 
unaware—when one does not know, one does not “see.” When one cannot “see,” 
one cannot act. Prior to reading the last few pages, the smartphone did not stand 
out glaringly as an ethical minefield, but blended seamlessly with the rest of our 
busy lives. In fact, we purchase smartphone family plans and congratulate 
ourselves for having done our children a “good” turn. 
In addition to arguing that virtue ethics is concerned about what we can 
                                                 
77
 Isaac of Ninevah, Mystical Treatises (Ascetical Homilies), trans. Translated from Bedjan’s 
Syriac Text with an introduction and registers by A. J. Wensinck (Amsterdam: n.p., 1939), 158. 
78
 Ibid., 159. 
 46 
and cannot “see,” I also argued above that the forming of habits is a simple fact of 
biology. When we do not form habits intentionally, they are formed for us. A 
recent study of 18-24-yr-olds found that 5% (one in 20) check their smartphones 
once every minute. The average wait time between cold checks is a mere ten 
minutes. Theologian and ethicist Jeff Vogel suggests we may willingly be colluding 
with the habit of frequent checking because we live lives “in pursuit of 
interruption.” We want “something—anything—to happen.” And with a 
smartphone we can generate our own interruption. Thus we acquire the habit of 
holding ourselves in the state of perpetual readiness to be distracted.79  
Of course, not all of our habits are fallen into. I’ve also argued that human 
beings are built to form habits intentionally. The earliest Christians deliberately 
imitated Christ (2 Pe 2:21), imitated Paul (1 Cor 11:11), imitated Paul’s disciple 
Timothy (2 Tim 2:2), imitated faithful leaders, (Heb 13:7), imitated other 
congregations (1 Thess 2:14), and so on with each successive generation. By the 
fourth century, Athanasius wrote about the imitation principle this way: 
One cannot possibly understand the teaching of the saints unless one has a 
pure mind and is trying to imitate their life….anyone who wishes to 
understand the mind of the sacred writers must first cleanse his own life, 
and approach the saints by copying their deeds.80  
If the chain of Christians-imitating-Christians can provide us with any tips 
it would be this: Chief among the body-shaping activities that can counter 
covetousness is “fasting.” Although serious fasting is not in vogue today, it 
once was. When fasting had been practiced by Christians for nearly a 
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millennium, it was “known to every one” that fasting “is the fountain of all 
good.” Indeed, it was common knowledge that fasting was the 
“strengthening of all the virtues” and is in itself “beautiful,” since fasting 
“naturally excites vigilance unto God.”81  
The kind of fasting of which our forebears spoke is not to be confused with 
skipping desserts or foregoing foods we deem yucky anyway. Fasting is the regular, 
surrender of what we need to live. Food obviously fits. But what about the 
smartphone? Perhaps smartphone use fits this category too. (Then again, perhaps 
one cannot know until one tries to give it up.) 
I find myself secretly hoping that the seventh-century theologian Isaac of 
Nineveh is exaggerating: “For fasting is a storehouse of all virtues. And he that 
despises it, makes all virtues totter.”82 I, for one, would rather face the day with “a 
full tank” than with hunger gnawing around the edges. So I consult another of the 
church fathers and find that Augustine of Hippo agrees with Isaac of Nineveh: “in 
this world we ought not to love fullness.”83  What am I to do? When my ‘druthers 
goes head to head with the church fathers, whose ‘druthers should I trust? It 
depends: who am I? Of which people am I a member? And what sort of people 
ought we to be? 
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